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CHAPTER I I

EXECUTIVE POWER
AND THE ACA
Nicholas Bagley

As with any law of its complexity and ambition, the Affordable Care
Act (ACA) vests in the sitting president broad implementation discre.:.
tion. The law is not a blank check: in many ways both large and small,
the ACA shapes and constrains the exercise of executive power. But
Congress has neither the institutional resources nor the attention span
to micromanage the rollout of a massive health program. It has no
choice but to delegate.
Naturally, both President Obama and President Trump have drawn
on their authority to tailor the ACA to their policy preferences. Neither president, however, has been able to turn to Congress for more
sweeping changes to the law. Stymied in Congress and buffeted by the
partisan combat over Obamacare, they have come under enormous
pressure to ignore legal constraints that stand in the way of their political objectives. The story of the ACN.s implementation is thus a story
of two presidents who have tested-and at times exceeded-the limits
of their legal powers.•
Yet Obama and Trump have committed very different legal sins.
President Obama's lawbreaking reflected his efforts to cope with the
ambiguities, omissions, and outright mistakes that are common in any
massive law and were especially common in the ACA. To implement
the bill in the face of congressional resistance, the Obama administration cut corners. President Trump, however, exploited his position as
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the head of the executive branch to mount an unconstitutional campaign to sabotage the very law he is charged with faithfully executing.
It would' be comforting to treat these legal violations as aberrant
responses to particular features of the ACA or to the intensity of debate
over health reform. But they cannot be so easily dismissed. The ACA
is the most assertive effort in 50 years to make good on the claim that
health care is a right, not a privilege. That is another way of saying
that the have-nots have a moral claim to the resources and privileges
of the haves. The campaign against the law is the reactionary countermobilization of those who believe that the principles animating the
ACA pose an incipient threat to the established order. No wonder that
health reform provoked the most rancorous battle over a piece of domestic legislation since the adoption of the Civil Rights Act in 1964.
The fight over the ACA may therefore offer a disquieting preview
of what may come if Congress moves to address the nation's other
yawning inequalities. Like the ACA, future laws will delegate wide
authority to the president. They too will contain unanticipated flaws.
And they will also be subject to implementation by hostile presidents.
Legal constraints on the executive branch buckled in the white-hot
heat of the battle over the ACA. They could melt away altogether in
the next war.

President Obama
In November 2010, a scant eight months after the ACX.s adoption,
Republicans took control of the House of Representatives. Spurred
by a Tea Party that saw Obamacare as its principal grievance, the restive House majority committed itself to dismantling the law. Without
Congress to help it iron out implementation difficulties, the Obama
administration was on its own.

The Delays
In July 2013, Valerie Jarrett, a senior adviser to the president, announced
that the administration would temporarily suspend enforcement of the
so-called employer mandate. Technically, the name is a misnomer: the
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law imposes no mandate but instead exacts a tax on larger firms that
do not offer health insurance to their workers. That tax serves a dual
purpose: it encourages employers to offer coverage and, failing that,
generates revenue to offset the costs of the ACN.s coverage expansion.
Under the law, the .employer mandate was supposed to go into effect in 2014- But the administration, under intense pressure from business groups, said that it would not collect the tax that year. "In our
ongoing discussions with businesses," Jarrett explained, "we have heard
that you need the time to get this right. We are listening."1 Later, the
administration announced additional suspensions of the mandate for
midsize .firms.
These were not the only delays. In pressing for the ACN.s adoption,
President Obama repeatedly promised that "if you like your health
care planj you can keep it." 2 But that was not exactly true. The ACA
imposed stringent new rules on privately sold insurance-including
limits on out-of-pocket spending and a mandatory suite of benefitsthat rendered most existing policies unlawful.. (The law did include a
grandfather clause, but it was too narrow to save most plans.) As 2013
came to a dose, thousands of people began receiving cancelation notices in the mail.
Republicans pounced. As the political heat rose, moderate Democrats in Congress began to clamor for legislation. The administration,
however, feared that any law that could make it through a Republican-controlled House would damage the ACA on the eve of its implementation. President Obama called for an administrative .fix, one that
entailed another delay. In a letter, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) invited state insurance commissioners to waive,
for one year, the ACA'.s new rules for existing plans. 3 More than 30
states did, and four subsequent letters have extended the administrative
fix through 202i.4
Was it legal for the Obama administration to delay parts of ,the
ACA? In general, the executive branch has the discretion to choose
when and how to enforce a particular law against particular offenders.
As the Supreme Court has said, a federal agency knows best "whether
agency resources are best spent on this violation or another." 5 In the
Obama administration's view, delaying the employer mandate and the
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AC.Ifs insurance rules amounted to a routine and temporary exercise of
enforcement discretion.
The ACA delays were unusual, however, because they were not efforts to. target limited enforcement resources at the worst offenders.
Instead, they were blanket policies adopted for reasons of political ex-:pedience-·in this case, the perceived need to mollify employers and
Congress in an effort to minimize threats to a fledgling statute. The
delays were also unusual .in that they were announced publicly.. The
federal government usually keeps its enforcement policies secret because it wants people to comply with the law even if it does not wish
to prioritize its enforcement. Here, however, the publicity was necessary to relieve employers and insurers of their legal obligations. As the
courts. have explained, ''An agency's pronouncement of a broad policy
against enforcement poses special risks that it has consciously and expressly adopted a general policy that is so extreme as to amount to an
abdication of its statutory responsibilities." 6
In short, President Obama lacked the power to prospectively license
large groups of people to disregard one of Congress's laws.7 Doing so
violated his constitutional obligation to "take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed." 8 The delays may also embolden future presidents
to delay laws that they dislike. Indeed, early in his presidency, President
Trump toyed with suspending enforcement of the individual mandate-which, like the employer mandate, was also a tax. 9

1he Cost-Sharing Payments
To make individual health plans affordable, the ACA offers generous
subsidies to cover the costs of monthly premiums. Those subsidies,
however, do not cover out-of-pocket payments, which can be extravagantly large: deductibles for an exchange plan in 2019 averaged $4,375. 10
To address the problem, the ACA requires insurers to give their
lowest-income customers a large discount on their out-of-pocket payments. In exchange, the ACA promises to pay insurers to make up
for the lost revenue. Without those promised cost-sharing payments,
premiums for health plans on the exchanges would skyrocket (or so the
thinking ran at the time of the law's adoption). With the payments,
coverage would remain affordable.
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There was a hitch, however. The Constitution says that "no Money
shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropria"'
tions made by Law." 11 Although Congress specifically appropriated the
money for premium subsidies, the ACA did not include an express appropriation for the cost-sharing payments. Its absence was apparently
an oversight-one that would probably have been addressed had the
ACA passed through a House-Senate conference committee for a final
clean-up, as was the original plan. As detailed in Chapter 7, however,
the death of Senator Ted Kennedy and Republican Scott Brown's subsequent victory in the Massachusetts special election foreclosed that
possibility.
In the normal course, Congress would have promptly appropriated
the money necessary to make good on its promises. But the ACA was
not a normal statute, and a Republican-controlled House of Representatives was unlikely to supply an appropriation to fund a law that it had
voted dozens of times to repeal. As the 2014 date for fully implementing
the law drew near, the Obama administration was in a bind. It could
either adhere to the Constitution-and watch the ACA collapse-or it
could find some way to make the payments anyhow.
The Obama administration took the latter approach, offering a
paper-thin legal rationale for the claim that Congress had implicitly
appropriated the money. In the administration's view, the premium
subsidies and the cost-sharing payments were both essential parts of
a common scheme to defray the cost of health plans. Congress must
therefore have wanted the appropriation for premium subsidies to do
double-duty as an appropriation for the cost-sharing payments.
The argument, however, does not hold together. To appropriate the
money for premium subsidies, Congress amended a portion of the tax
code allowing the IRS to return tax refunds to individuals. That made
sense: the premium subsidies are, in fact, tax credits. Cost-sharing payments, in contrast, are direct payments to insurers. It is a big stretch
to read an appropriation governing refunds for individual taxpayers to
also cover payments that have nothing to do with the tax code. And
federal law prohibits the executive branch from reading a law to appropriate money unless the law "specifically states that an appropriation
is made." 12
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An angry House of Representatives filed suit to challenge the payments. Two years later, it won its case in federal court in Washington,
DC. 13 Although the court put its opinion on hold to allow for an appeal, President Trump was elected before that appeal could be heard. As
congressional Republicans moved to repeal the ACA, President Trump
tried to force Democrats to the bargaining table by threatening the
cessation of the cost-sharing payments. When repeal legislation stalled
out, the president unceremoniously terminated the payments. Only a
clever workaround (so-called silver loading, discussed in Chapter IO)
has allowed the states to avoid the feared deterioration of their insurance markets.
In some respects the Obama administration's decision to ignore appropriations law was an understandable-if regrettable-response to
the kind of,statutory problem that arises when a complex bill passes
through an unconventional legislative process in a sharply divided
Congress. But the decision has unsettling implications. Will future
presidents likewise misconstrue appropriations measures when necessary to achieve their policy objectives?
Again, the question is not hypothetical. When Congress refused
to appropriate $5 billion that Trump requested for the construction of
a wall at the southern border, the administration declared a "national
emergency" and interpreted an existing law to allow him to reprogram
funds appropriated for military purposes. 14 The statutory argument was
weak, but no weaker than the argument President Obama advanced to
make cost-sharing payments.
The point is not that one bad act leads to another. Trump would
still have reprogrammed the wall funding even if Obama had been
more scrupulous about appropriations .law. The point, instead, is about
presidential incentives. Confronted with an uncooperative Congress,
both presidents broke the law, betting that the American public would
not punish them for doing so in the next election. They were probably
right about that: in a country riven by a stark partisan divide, elections
are unlikely to turn on a president's adherence to the finer points of
appropriations law. There is thus reason to worry that our next president will exercise even less self-restraint than either Presidents Obama
orTrump.
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President Trump
President Truinp'.s first act as president was to sign an executive order
telling his agencies to "take all actions consistent with law to minimize
the unwarranted economic and regulatory burdens of the act." 15 These
were to be temporary measures, lasting only until the president secured
the ACN.s repeal. When the repeal effort faltered in Congress, however,
Trump was put into. the awkward position of implementing a law he
hated.
• Trump could have embraced his constitutional duty to "take care that
the laws be faithfully executed." Instead, he has used his authority to sabotage the ACA at every turn. Inured as we are to the hardball of partisan
politics, it would he. easy to overlook just how irregular this is. A president is not obliged to exercise his discretion in a manner that his. political
opponents would prefer, but the Constitution places out of bounds actions that aim to undermine an act of Congress in order to pave the way
for its elimination. Not since Reconstruction has a president worked so
systematically to subvert a major congressional initiative.
The still-urifinished story of Trump's sabotage may set a template for
what is to come. One party gains temporary control of Congress and
the White House and adopts an ambitious new policy, only to watch a
subsequent president from the other political party move to dismantle it
through executive action. Guarding against that kind of abuse may prove
difficult. The ACA, for example, contains more than 40 provisions contemplating rulemaking from federal agencies, which is not at all unusual
for major legislation. 16 Though Congress could try to bulletproof future
laws by narrowing .the discretion they afford to the executive branch,
those laws might then be too rigid to achieve the legislature's goals. In
any event, no law of any complexity cari be implemented without the
aid of the executive branch, meaning that every significant reform will
be subject, to some degree or another, t-o presidential tampering. In this
bitterly divided country, sabotage may become the new normal. -

Ihe Exchanges
Immediately after taking office, the Trump administration moved to
destabilize the insurance exchanges. Its first act was to cut 90% of the
$l00 million that Healthcare.gov had used for advertising in 2016. The
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administration paired that cut with a 41% cut to the navigator program, which pays for in-person guides to help people buy insurance.
Still deeper cuts to navigator funding were announced in July 2018.
None of these cuts was likely to discourage sick people from enrolling;
they would, however, depress enrollment by healthy people, unbalancing the risk pool and driving premiums higher.
In 2018 the Trump administration proposed two rules that would
have much the same effect. The first offered a new definition of what
the ACA calls "short-term, limited duration insurance." Because shortterm plans are meant to cover only brief gaps in coverage, they are
exempt from most of the ACN.s rules. Short-ter'm plans can reject unhealthy people, decline to cover preexisting conditions, and exclude
benefits like maternity care or drug coverage. The only advantage of
short-term plans is that they are cheap, at least for healthy people. But
the ACN.s insurance exchanges will struggle to spread risk if too many
healthy people buy short-term plans instead of conventional insurance.
Nonetheless, the Trump administration proposed defining shortterm insurance to include plans that lasted 364 days in the year and
could be renewed for up to three years. The interpretation is controversial: Is a health plan that covers you for 99. 7% of the year really
"short term"? Nonetheless, the administration has moved forward and
hopes to make short-term plans a realistic long-term option for healthy
people. Many of those same people will be in for a surprise when they
discover just how stingy those short-term plans are.
The second rule relaxed restrictions on association health plans. Under federal law, small businesses are allowed to join together to buy
insurance for their employees. When they do, the law treats them as
large employers and exempts them from rules requiring insurers to sell
health plans at much the same price to everyone. In the past, only
businesses in the same line of work were allowed to create association
health plans-all the bakeries in town, for example. The Trump administration, however, sought to relax that obligation and enable small
businesses in any line of work-and even self-employed individualsto form association health plans.
As with the rule governing short-term plans, the goal was to allow
healthier-than-average people to flee the exchanges. Both rules would
therefore drive up the costs of insurance for the sicker-than-average
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people left behind. Among stakeholders, the rules were wildly unpopular: "More than 95% of health care groups that have commented on
President Trump's effort to weaken Obama-era health insurance rules
criticized or outright opposed the proposals," reported the Los Angeles
nmes. 17 In the summer of 2018 the Trump administration finalized the
rules anyway.
There is nothing unusual about an administration issuing rules to
interpret an ambiguous law. What is unusual, however, is for an administration to adopt legally dubious interpretations in a deliberate
effort to thwart the law altogether. Predictably, both rules have been
challenged in court. In March 2019 one judge in Washington, DC,
invalidated the rule governing association health plans because it "was
intended and designed to end run the requirements of the ACA." 18 Not
long after, a different judge on the same court upheld the rule governing short-term health plans, reasoning that Congress did not impose
hard-and-fast limits on the length of plans and that the court "cannot
simply ignore the legislature's choice to use indefinite, flexible phraseology."19 As of this writing, both cases have been appealed.
There is more. Under the ACN.s risk-adjustment program, insurers
with relatively healthy enrollees are required to transfer some of the
premiums they receive to health plans with relatively unhealthy enrollees. By balancing risk, the program is supposed to discourage insurers
from competing with one another to attract the healthiest people. Risk
adjustment is not controversial and is used in both Medicare Advantage and Medicare Part D. In February 2018, however, a court in New
Mexico decided that the HHS rule govetning the program was invalid
because it had not been adequately explained. 20 The Trump administration could have issued a new rule to address the court's· concerns.
Alternatively, it could have appealed and asked that the court's decision
be placed on hold. Instead, without warning, the Trump administration abruptly suspended risk-adjustment payments, sending. shockwaves through the insurance industry. 21 The political blowback was so
intense that the administration quickly backtracked. But the signal was
dear: the exchanges were in the crosshairs.
The latest blow to the exchanges came in a highly technical rule,
released in April 2019, that increased the amount that the ACA requites
people to pay toward their insurance. The details of the new rule are
0
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less important' than the bottom line: according to the Trump administration's own estimates, IO0,ooo people are expected to lose coverage on account of the price hike. 22 Nothing in the ACA demanded
the change, and leaked documents jndicate that HHS recommended
against it because it "would cause coverage losses, further premium
increases, and market disruption." 23 But these were virtues, not vices,
to a -white House bent on sabotage.
All told, the Trump administration's actions are estimated to have
increased annual premiums on the exchanges by an average of $580. 24
So far, however, the exchanges have survived, mainly because of how
the ACA structures its premium subsidies. For people earning less than
four times the federal poverty level (just under $50,000 for an individual in 2019), the ACA caps their premiums at just less than IO%
of their income. No matter how high premiums go, most people will
pay the same. The biggest losers, instead, are people earning more than
four times the poverty level who need to cover every dollar of those
increased premiums.
Republicans may come to rue their support for the Trump administration's sabotage campaign. The exchanges are the types of public-private partnerships that they have long endorsed as an alternative
to bloated government bureaucracies. The more dysfunctional the exchanges become, the less defensible these sorts of partnerships appear. It
is no accident that the Trump administration's attacks on the exchanges
have coincided with an increase in support for reforms like Medicare
for All that do not depend on private insurance. Such programs may
also be less vulnerable to tampering by an unfriendly executive branch.

Medicaid
As Chapters IO, 12, and 18 explained, the ACA transformed Medicaid
from a welfare program for the "deserving" poor into a social-service
program for all the poor. The Trump administration, however, has
tried to use its executive power to undo that transformation-most
significantly, by granting waivers allowing nine states to impose work
requirements on the expansion population. Nine more requests are
pending.
A number of lawsuits have been filed challenging the waivers.
As of this writing, a district court in Washington, DC, has struck
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down work requirements in three states: Arkansas, Kentucky, and
New Hampshire. 25 The court's reasoning is straightforward. By Jaw,
any waivers must be "likely to assist in promoting the objectives" .of
the Medicaid program. And Medicaid's central objective, the judge
found, is to extend medical care to needy people. The Trump administration never adequately explained how waivers that would force tens
of thousands of people off Medicaid could possibly be consistent with
that objective.
In so doing, the court brushed aside the Trump administration's
argument that the point of Medicaid is not just to provide medical care
hut also to improve health. "Were that the case," the court reasoned,
"nothing would prevent the Secretary from conditioning coverage on
a special diet or certain exercise regime." 26 Even if work requirements
might promote health for some people, the administration never
weighed those health benefits against the harms arising from the loss of
coverage. The court found that such a failure of explanation made the
waivers arbitrary and capricious.
Taken together, the court's rulings reflect the view that the Trump
administration cannot use work requirements to thwart the ACX.s
changes to Medicaid. Whether those rulings hold up on appeal is another question. In the past, the courts have generally not been moved
by the argument that Medicaid waivers cannot be used to make fundamental changes to Medicaid.

Texas v. United States
Perhaps the Trump administration's most audacious move against the
ACA has been its support of a lawsuit seeking to invalidate it altogether. As discussed in Chapters 8 and 9, Republican attorneys general from 20 states brought a case in February 2018 claiming that the
individual mandate-the same mandate that the Supreme Court had
previously sustained as a proper exercise of Congress's power to tax-is
now unconstitutional, and that the entire ACA must fall with it.
In late 2017j after several failed attempts to repeal and replace the
entire ACA, Congress passed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, which included what President Trump characterized as "the Repeal of the highly
unpopular Individual Mandate." 27 The Republican attorneys general,
however, noticed that Congress did not formally repeal the ACX.s
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command to buy insurance. Instead, Congress zeroed out the penalty
for going without coverage. Functionally, it was a distinction without
a difference: only the penalty gave the mandate any force and effect.
Without a penalty, the mandate was defunct.
The attorneys general, however, seized on the formal distinc;:tion.
When it upheld the individual mandate as· a tax, the Supreme Court
had also reasoned that it would exceed Congress's powers under the
Commerce Clause to order people to buy coverage. Now that the tax
penalty, had been repealed, the attorneys general ·argued, the naked
mandate that remained on the books could not be defended as a tax. It
was simply a command and must therefore be unconstitutional.
From that premise-that the zero-dollar mandate is unconstitutional-the attorneys general built the astonishing argument that the
entire ACA must fall. When Congress passed the ACA in 2010, Congress adopted findings saying that the individual mandate was essential. Because those findings remain on the books, Congress, in 2017
must still have thought that the mandate was essential-even a mandate backed by no penalty. And because this mandate is so intertwined
with the law as a whole, the entire law must be invalidated.
The consensus among legal scholars on both sides of the aisle is that
the argument is frivolous. Congressional Republicans had a chance after Trump's election to repeal the ACA They did not have the votes.
Zeroing out the mandate penalty was a consolation prize. As such,
there is no need to speculate on whether Congress preferred the ACA
without a mandate to no ACA at all. It made that choice by repealing
the only mechanism for enforcing the mandate while leaving the rest of
the law intact. The very same Congress did not harbor the secret belief
that a zero-dollar mandate was vital to the law's continued operation.
The Trump administration saw a chance, however, to achieve in
court what it could not achieve in Congress. The Justice Department
has a long tradition, adhered to across Republican and Democratic
administrations, of defending acts of Congress if any reasonable argument can be made on their behal£ 28 Otherwise, the Justice Department
could pick and choose which laws remained on the books by declining
to defend when a lawsuit is brought challenging a law it dislikes. Refusing to defend can thus do violence to the principle that Congress
makes the law, not the president.
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Nevertheless, the Trump administration's Justice Department threw
its support behind the lawsuit. Initially, it argued that the individual
mandate's supposed constitutional defect required invalidation of those
portions of the ACA requiring insurers to sell to all comers at more or
less the same price-in other words, the protections for people with
preexisting conditions. But it has since decided that the entire Act must
fall and is now pressing that view in the federal courts.
By filing suit in Fort Worth,Texas, the challengers were able to channel their case to one of the most conservative judges in the country, one
who had already invalidated prior Obama-era rules implementing the
ACA. In December 2018 the judge declared the individual mandate unconstitutional and the entire ACA invalid. 29 On appeal, a conservative
panel of the US Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit agreed that the
mandate could not be sustained. But it asked the judge to reconsider
whether there might be some portions of the law that could be salvaged.
As of this writing, most close observers believed the lawsuit is unlikely to succeed. Nothing is certain, however, especially where the
ACA is concerned. And the sheer irresponsibility of the lawsuit is
breathtaking. The ACA is now part of the plumbing of the US health
care system and ripping it out would inflict untold damage on the
economy. Yet the Trump administration has publicly committed itself
to a legal position that would do just that.
More worrisome still, the duty to defend is a close cousin to the
president's constitutional duty to faithfully execute the law. If the ACA
really is so unconstitutional that the Trump administration can make
no argument in its defense, the law's continued implementation must
likewise violate the Constitution. It is not hard to see that as -an incipient justification for refusing to enforce any law that the president
believes to be unconstitutional, however preposterous or partisan that
belief might be.

Conclusion
One president broke the law to save it. The next abused his power to
savage it. Each in his own way violated his constitutional duty of faithful execution.
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It is tempting but wrong to chalk up the legal violations to these
presidents' particular psychologies: an arrogant Obama, an unprincipled Trump. The truth is bleaker. In high-stakes battles where partisan
lines have been drawn, the incentives to adhere to the law-the fear of
political fallout, concerns about judicial review, some ingrained sense
of morality-may not be robust enough to keep the president within
bounds.
After all, the public's ability to censure a lawbreaking president depends on knowing when censure is warranted. But the legal experts
who might object to illegal executive actions are not immune from partisan tribalism. Few lawyers who support the ACA criticized Obama
when he broke the law. Those who complained loudest about Obama's
lawbreaking have mostly fallen silent under Trump. As claims of lawbreaking come to be seen as partisan gripes, the American public grows
numb to arguments that the president is flouting the law.
And so the rule of law decays. All major statutes-the ACA included-assign vast responsibilities to the executive branch; indeed,
broad delegations are an ineradicable feature of the modern administrative state. But that makes any substantial legislative reform vulnerable to abuse from the very executive branch charged with overseeing it.
If we are indeed entering an era marked by the steady erosion of legal
constraints on the president, Congress's authority to chart the country's
course will diminish over time-a development with consequences for
American governance that are hard to predict but likely pernicious.
The adoption of the ACA marked a progressive victory. The story of
its implementation, however, offers a cautionary tale.

